Title of Invention

A METHOD AND AN APPARATUS FOR ACCESS AUTHENTICATION IN A WIRELESS MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Abstract The invention relates to a method for Access Authentication in the High Rate Packet Data Network is proposed in the present invention comprising steps of the AN-AAA receiving the Radius Access Request message sent from the HRPD AN; the AN-AAA judging whether a terminal is a roaming one according to the Network Access ID and transmits the roaming terminal's authentication information to the terminal's home network. If said terminal is a local one, the AN-AAA judges the type of the terminal according to the NAI value. If said terminal is a single-mode one, the AN-AAA works out the Result2 with the MD5 algorithm, if said terminal is in dual-mode, the AN-AAA calculates the Result2 with the CAVE algorithm to compare the Result1 with the Result2.
Full Text METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR ACCESS AUTHENTICATION
IN WIRELESS MOBILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to a method and Apparatus for Access
Network Authentication, Authorization and Accounting server (hereinafter
referred to as AN-AAA)in a High Rate Packet Data (hereinafter referred to
as HRPD) network, especially to the AN-AAA method of HRPD network
that simultaneously supports the CAVE and MD5 algorithms.
2. Description of the Related Art
Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (hereinafter referred to as cdma2000)
network has been widely applied commercially all over the world. In this
kind of network, a Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(hereinafter referred to as CHAP) based on the Cellular Authentication and
Voice Encryption (hereinafter referred to as CAVE) algorithm has been
adopted to identify the legitimacy of the access terminals. This
authentication system has relatively perfect methods on illegal
attack-protecting. A Mobile Station's (hereinafter referred to as MS) privacy
key (A-key) and the CAVE algorithm are stored . in this MS and the
cdma2000 network's authentication center respectively. The authentication
process mainly includes such two procedures as the update of Shared Secret
Data (SSD) and the implementation of authentication. Part A of the Shared
Secret Data (SSD_A) is used for access authentication. According to
specific conditions, the network sends a message including a segment of
random numbers to the MS and the authentication center respectively to
update the SSD_A data. After this message is received by the MS and the
authentication center respectively, the included random numbers, the A-key
and other parameters are together input into the "SSDGENEREATION
PROCEDURE" to generate an SSD_A through calculation. After
conforming the correctness, the old SSD_A is replaced with the new one
which will be used as the key for the access authentication. When an

authentication is needed to be done on a terminal terminal, the network
sends an authentication request message to the MS and the authentication
center, including a segment of random numbers. After this message is
received by the MS and the authentication center respectively, the
authentication result will be calculated with the random numbers included
in this message, the SSD_A and other parameters according to the CAVE
algorithm. The MS sends authentication results to the authentication center.
By comparing the differences between the authentication results, the MS
can be authenticated to be valid . To prevent any vicious terminal from
stealing others' keys, the SSD_A (which is used as the temporary privacy
key) can be updated frequently. Therefore, this authentication mode has
very high level of security. In practice, the A-key can be stored in two
modes. One is that it is stored in the MS, and the corresponding CAVE
algorithm is also implemented in the MS which the card can not be
separated from the MS. The other is that the A-key is stored in the
Removable User Identification Module (hereinafter referred to as the
R-UIM card), and the corresponding CAVE algorithm is also implemented
in the R-UIM card which the card is separatable from the MS. At present,
only the MSs that the card is separatable from the MS are in service in
China, while the MSs that the card can not be separated from the MS are in
service in most foreign countries. The HRPD network is the upgrade of
cdma2000 network and has been gradually adopted in commercial
application all over the world. The HRPD network's access authentication
server is called AN-AAA. As prescribed in the corresponding standard of
the 3G Partnership Project 2 (hereinafter referred to as 3GPP2), if the access
authentication is adopted by the HRPD network, the authentication mode
should also be the CHAP authentication, but no detailed encryption
algorithm is specified explicitly, which can be specified by the concrete
operator. As the cdma2000 network, according to the location where the
privacy key is stored, HRPD's access terminals (referred to as AT) can be
divided into such two kinds as the one that the card is separatable from the
AT and the one that the card can not be separated from the AT.
The HRPD network and the cdma2000 network are independent of each
other. The structure of cdma2000 network is illustrated in figure 6 in which
the information is transferred by terminals. Terminals(610) are linked with
base stations(620) via over -the-air interface. The base stations(620) and

base station controllers(630) constitute a radio access network for the
conversion and process of the terminal's signalling and data. A mobile
switch center(640) is responsible for user data and service exchange and is
linked with the radio access network via interface A. A visitor location
register(640) is used for the management of user's location information and
implements the function of local authentication. In practice, it is often set
cooperatively with the mobile switch center. A home location register(650)
is responsible for saving user's permanent information and resolving the
problem of user roaming. The authentication centre(650) is responsible for
authentication tasks. In general, local authentication is implemented by the
visitor location register(640). In practice, the home location register(650) is
often set cooperatively with the authentication centre(650). The visitor
location register is linked with the home location register via the interface D
under the mobile application protocol ANSI-41.
Figure 7 illustrates the structure of the HRPD network in which the
information is transferred by terminals(710). The access network(720)
offers the function of radio access for users. It is used for the conversion
and process of terminal's signalling and data. Terminals(710) are linked
with the access network(720) via the over-the-air interface, and the
AN-AAA{730) is used for the tasks of authentication, authorization and
accounting.
In practice, no information exchanges between the cdma2000 network and
the HRPD network except that they share the same packet data core
network. Because the HRPD network mainly provides terminals with data
service, the terminals can share the services through the dual-mode
terminals that simultaneously support cdma2000 network and the HRPD
network, and this category of terminal is the main cluster of terminals of the
HRPD network. In the context, except specifically pointed out, the
dual-mode terminals refer to the cdma2000/HRPD ones.
In order to better illustrating the present invention, figure 2, figure 3 and
figure 4 are used to describe the operation process in the MS side during the
cdma2000 network's authentication process, and figure 5 is used to describe
the message stream which is defined in 3GPP2 when the access
authentication is carried out in the HRPD network.
1) The process in the MS side during the existing cdma2000 network's
authentication process.

The operation process in the MS side during the existing cdma2000
network's authentication process consists of two processes: SSD_A update
procedure and the authentication procedure.
The SSD_A update process is used for improving the authentication
system's capability of attack-protecting. The basic operation process is
illustrated in figure 2:
a HLR/AC in the system sends a Shared Secrete Data Update Message
to a mobile terminal, including RANDSSD which is a 56-bit long random
number in step 201;
after receiving the message mentioned above, the mobile terminal
initiates a SSD_A generation process. The A-key and the random number
above are input into this process to generate a new shared secret data (SSD),
which contains part A and part B in step 202;
The same operation is performed in the system side in step 203;
The correctness of the operations performed above must be verified for
the mobile terminal and the system. For this end, the mobile terminal
generates a segment of random number and sends it to the system
simultaneously in step 206. In the terminal side, both this segment of
random number and the new SSD_A are input into the authentication
signature program to generate a result in the terminal side in step 204;
In the system side, the same authentication signature program is
performed to obtain a result of the base station side and the system sends
the result of the base station to the terminal in step 205; and
The terminal compares the result from the Base Station with the result
calculated by itself. If they are just the same, the SSD_A update process
completes successfully, and the terminal and the system adopts the new
SSD simultaneously, otherwise, the original SSD should be still in service
in step 206.
During the process above, the A-key is 64-bit long, which is allocated to
an MS by the operator. Only the corresponding MS and the network
authentication centre (AuC) know the corresponding A-key. In a practical
network, the AuC cooperates with the Home Location Register (i.e., HLR)
as the HLR/AuC.
The process of generating the SSD is illustrated in figure 3. The
parameters including the 56-bit long random number RANDSSD(310), the
32-bit long electronic serial number (in the case of using R-UIM card,

which can be the R-UIM ID)(320), and the 64-bit long terminal's password
A-key(330) are input into the SSD generation procedure(360). The SSD
generation procedure is carried out to generate the part A(340) and part
B(350) of the new 64-bit long SSD.
The authentication process is the process of a terminal's legitimacy
verification whose basic operations are illustrated in figure 4.
The AuC sends a Challenge message to the MS, including a 32-bit long
random number RAND in step 410. The MS takes the RAND and the
SSD_A as the inputs of the CAVE algorithm to calculate an 18-bit long
result AUTH in step 430. Then the MS sends the AUTH to the
authentication center by an Authentication Challenge Response message in
step 440, and the AuC compares the AUTH with the result worked out by
itself with the same method. If they are just the same, the authentication
passes, otherwise, this MS is rejected to access the network in step 450.
Because of the roaming problem, the SSD_A is generally shared
between the HLR/AuC and the Visitor Location Register (hereinafter
referred to as VLR) which is nearer the terminal to speed up the access
authentication and reduce network transmission in network
implementations. The connection between the VLR and the HLR/AuC is
realized via the interface D in the Mobile Application Protocol (MAP)
ANSI-41 prescribed by the American National Standards institute (ANSI),
through which an ANSI-41 message is transmitted.
(2) The message flows of the existing HRPD network's access
authentication
The HRPD network's access authentication includes following message
flows, as shown in figure 5:
The access network (AN) sends a CHAP Challenge message to the
access terminal (AT), including the random number "Random text"in step
501.
The terminal receives the Chap Challenge message, and then calculates
an authentication parameter 1 with the received random number. In the
figure, the encryption algorithm MD5 is taken as an example to make
further explanationsin step 502.
The terminal sends a Chap Response message to the AN, including
information of AT's Network Access ID (NAI), random number "text", the
authentication parameter 1 and so on in step 503.

After receiving the Chap Response message from the terminal, the AN
sends a Radius Access Request message to the AN-AAA, including the
three parameters included in the Chap Response message in step 504.
The AN-AAA inputs the random text and the local Password (AN-AAA
Password and the AT's Password are just the same) into the MD5 algorithm
to calculate an authentication parameter 2 in step 505.
The AN-AAA compares the authentication parameter 1 with the
authentication parameter 2 in step 506.
If they are just the same, it sends a Authentication Access Accept
message to the AN, indicating that the authentication passes. In this
message, the IMSI corresponding to the NAI of this AT is included, which
is used for subsequent flows by the AN in step 507.
If the authentication parameter 1 is not the same as the authentication
parameter 2, the AN-AAA sends a Authentication Access Reject message to
AN to reject the terminal in step 508.
After receiving the Authentication Access Accept message, the AN
sends a Chap Success message to the terminal, indicating that the
authentication process succeeds in step 509.
And after receiving the Authentication Access Rejeet message, the AN
sends a Chap Failure message to the terminal, indicating that the
authentication process fails in step 510.
In the procedures mentioned above, the encryption algorithm MD5 is
adopted by the terminal and the AN-AAA. No specification on the adoption
of encryption algorithms is given in the international standards while it can
be specified by the operator.
In practice, the voice service is provided by means of the cdma2000
network and the data service is provided by means of the HRPD network.
Therefore, the dual-mode terminals that support not only the cdma2000
network but also the HRPD network will take up a sizable share. Because
the cdma2000 network is generally established ahead of the HRPD network,
some terminals of the HRPD network are upgraded from that of the
cdma2000 network. In general, the existing MSs whose cards is separatable
from them support only the CAVE algorithm during the authentication
process. To support the dual-mode operation, the MSs' R-UIM cards should
be upgraded to the multi-mode ones, and make them support not only the
CAVE algorithm but also the HRPD network's access authentication

algorithms like the MD5 algorithm, etc., so as to support this two kinds of
networks' authentication simultaneously. Because of a great deal of
terminals, the fees spent on the upgrade of R-UIM cards will be very huge,
and this operation will bring much inconvenience to the terminals as well,
and by far, no multi-mode R-UIM card is on sale yet.
Therefore, as the cdma2000 network has been launched into operation
and holds a lot of terminals, how to realize the dual-mode terminal's access
authentication with the cost as low as possible is a challenge to the HRPD
network construction.
The existing R-UIM cards only support CAVE algorithm, not only the
network must be upgraded but also the R-UIM cards must be upgraded to
multi-mode ones to upgrade to the HRPD network.However, following
problems exsits: 1) no multi-mode R-UIM card is on sate by far; 2)
considerable fees should be spent on upgrading the R-UIM cards; and 3) it
is inconvenient for the terminals to replace the their R-UIM card.
Although the problems mentioned above will be avoided when the
authentication problem can be overcome in terms of the network side, no
function or operation flow of authenticating in terms of the HRPD network
side is launched to revolve the problems above by far. Thus the present
invention is proposed for it.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
An object of the present invention is to provide a method for access
authentication in a HRPD network without modifying HRPD message
streams, which can support the HRPD network access authentication of
dual-mode terminals that adopt CAVE algorithm. In addition, another object
of the present invention is to provide an authentication function with which
a terminal can realize the HRPD network access authentication by directly
inserting an original R-UIM card which is in service in the cdma2000
network into a dual-mode terminal.
To acchieve the object mentioned above, a method for access
authentication in a HRPD network comprising steps of:
after receiving a Radius Access Request message from a HRPD AN, an
AN-AAA judging a terminal's home location according to a NAI value

included in the received message;
forwarding the access request to the AN-AAA of the terminal's home
location for authentication if the AN-AAA determine that the terminal is
roaming;
for a local terminal, the AN-AAA judging the terminal type according to
the relevant information such as the NAI value;
for a cdma2000/HRPD dual-mode terminal, the AN-AAA generating a
random number "RAND" that is necessary to calculate the authentication
parameter 2 by using the "Random text" included in the Radius Access
Request message and calculating an authentication parameter 2 with the
RAND with a CAVE algorithm;
the AN-AAA comparing the authentication parameter 2 with the
authentication parameter 1 that is sent from the terminal through the Radius
Access Request message, and if they are just the same, the authentication
passes, otherwise, the terminal is rejected; and
for an HRPD single-mode terminal, the AN-AAA adopting a MD5
algorithm to perform authentication , calculating the authentication
parameter 2 with the user password and this random number and comparing
the authentication parameter 2 with the authentication parameter 1 that is
sent from the terminal through the Radius Access Request message, if they
are just the same, the authentication passes, otherwise, the terminal is
rejected.
In the steps above, the SSD_A in the AN-AAA is obtained from the
cdma2000 network. The AN-AAA obtains the SSD_A in virtue of the
HLR/AuC of the cdma2000 network. In this case, an ANSI-41 channel is
needed to be established between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AuC. The
AN-AAA is regarded as a virtual VLR of the cdma2000 network, and the
sharing of the SSD_A between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AuC is realized
by the ANSI-41 messages. Figure 8 illustrates the network connection in the
case that the SSD_A is shared between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AC, and
figure 9 illustrates a message flow in the case that the SSDA is shared
between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AC. When it is necessary to share the
SSD_A, the AN-AAA should construct the Authentication Request Call
message according to the contents of the Radius Access Request message
and then sends it to the HLR/AC. In the corresponding domains of this
message, the support to the CAVE authentication and the sharing of SSD

must be specified. If the Chap response message contains the parameter
SSD, the AN-AAA will extract the SSD and store for CAVE authentication.
The present invention is adapted to resolve the HRPD network access
authentication problem for the cdma2000/HRPD dual-mode terminals based
on CAVE authentication algorithm. In this invention, the HRPD network's
message flow is not needed to be modified, i.e., neither modification is
needed to be done to existing HRPD network access equipments, nor the
R-UIM card is needed to be replaced. The AN-AAA realized according to
the description of the present invention can implement a terminal's HRPD
network access authentication.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCOMPANYING DRAWINGS

Figure 1 illustrates a method for access authenticationaccording to the
present invention;
Figure 2 shows an update process of the shared secret data (SSD) in the
cdma2000 network;
Figure 3 shows a SSD generation procedure;
Figure 4 illustrates a CAVE authentication process;
Figure 5 shows a access authentication message flows in the HRPD
network(MD5);
Figure 6 illustrates a structure of the cdma2000 network;
Figure 7 illustrates a structure of the HRPD network;
Figure 8 illustrates a network connection in the case that the SSD_A is
shared between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AuC; and
Figure 9 illustrates a message flow in the case that the SSD_A is shared
between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AuC.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
The main object of the present invention is to realize the HRPD
network's authentication without modifying the large quantities of R-UIM
cards used in the existing cdma2000 MSs and the HRPD network's
authentication flow. With the AN-AAA according to the present solution,
the R-UIM cards can be still in service after the cdma2000 terminals are
upgraded to the cdma2000/HRPD dual-mode ones. In general, with the

present solution, marked benefits will be gained at very little cost.
The present invention is based on following facts that: the HRPD
network does not support the CAVE algorithm, because no message flow
that exists in the HRPD network can support the SSD update. However, the
existing terminals' R-UIM cards provide only the CAVE algorithm. The
main idea of the present invention is to make the existing HRPD message
flows support the CAVE algorithm with the method for HRPD network
access authentication, and in virtue of the SSD update result of the
cdma2000 network and the terminals, the object of not changing existing
terminals' R-UIM cards will be acchieved.
The authentication problem also can be well resolved for the HRPD
single-mode terminals that support the MD5 algorithm according to the
present invention.
To enable the HRPD network's AN-AAA to support CAVE-based and
MD5-based HRPD access authentications simultaneously without
modifying the HRPD's existing message flow, following aspects should be
performed by the AN-AAA:
(1) judging whether the terminal is a roaming one by the AN-AAA.
The Radius Access Request message is sent from the HRPD AN for
terminal authentication, which includes three parameters of the NAI, the
Random text and the Result 1. After receiving the Radius Access Request
message from the HRPD AN, the AN-AAA determines the terminal's home
location according to the NAI domain included in the received message. In
the present solution, the NAI value should be formed in the form of
[email protected] name. According to the domain name in the NAI, the
AN-AAA can determine whether this terminal roams from any other
operator . If it determines that the terminal roams from any other network,
the AN-AAA transmits this terminal's authentication information to the
corresponding home network. If it determines that the terminal is local, the
AN-AAA will further determine whether the terminal is roaming from
another place according to the IMSI in the NAI. If it determines that the
terminal is from another place, the AN-AAA will transmit the terminal's
authentication information to the AN-AAA of the terminal's home location
according to the IMSI.
(2) judging whether the terminal is in single-mode or dual-mode by the

AN-AAA.
Since the NAI value is a terminal's unique ID (they are not consistent
with one another), the AN-AAA can judge whether the terminal is in
single-mode or dual-mode according to the IMSI in the NAI value. If the
operator can allocate different IMSI number segmentes to a single-mode
terminal and a dual-mode terminal respectively, the AN-AAA can judge the
terminal's type according to the number segment which the IMSI belongs to,
and a terminal's type judgment can also be made by retrieving special flag
bits stored in the AN-AAA in advance according to the IMSI.
(3) processing the access authentication of an HRPD single-mode
terminal by the AN-AAA.
For the HRPD single-mode terminal, it is necessary for the AN-AAA to
store the terminal's password in advance. The AN-AAA calculates the
authentication parameter 2 by the MD5 algorithm with the terminal's
password and the "Random text" included in the Radius Access Request
message, and compares this result with the authentication parameter 1
fetched by the Result domain of the Radius Access Request message. If they
are just the same, the authentication passes, otherwise, the authentication
fails.
(4) processing the access authentication of a cdma2000/HRPD
dual-mode terminal by the AN-AAA.
4.1 obtaining a terminal's SSD_A in the AN-AAA
To support the CAVE algorithm, the AN-AAA obtains the terminal's
SSD_A from the cdma2000 network. The AN-AAA shares the SSD_A via
the HLR/AuC of the cdma2000 network. The AN-AAA is regarded as a
virtual VLR of the cdma2000 network and the ANSI-41 MAP D interface is
established between the AN-AAA and the HLR/AuC. The AN-AAA shares
the SSD_A with the cdma2000 network by the normal ANSI-41 messages.
4.2 processing the parameter domain "Random text" included in the Radius
Access Request message by the AN-AAA.
The AN-AAA obtains the 32-bit random number according to the
Random text. The Random text is a character string presented by octets
with lengh of over 32-bit. It is necessry to convert the octets into binary
format and extract 32 bits. No specification is given on the extraction of the -
32 bits but the consistency must be kept between the AT and the AN-AAA
at all. The AN-AAA calculates the authentication parameter 2 by the CAVE

algorithm with the 32-bit random number and the SSD_A obtained with the
approach above and other parameters, then compares it with the
authentication parameter 1. If they are just the same, the authentication on
the terminal passes, otherwise, the terminal is rejected to access the
network.
4.3 processing the parameter domain "Result" in the Radius Access
Request message by the AN-AAA.
The dual-mode terminal obtains the authentication parameter 1 through
the CAVE algorithm, which is carried by the Result domain. Since the
Result domain is relatively large, for the format in which the authentication
parameter 1 is stored in the Result domain, consistency should be
prescribed for the AN-AAA and the dual-mode terminals.
Figure 1 illustrates the method for access authentication in the HRPD
network. Now the operation steps will be explained in more detail.
The AN-AAA receives the Radius Access Request message from the
HRPD AN, in which parameters of the Network Access ID (NAI), the
Random text, the authentication parameter 1 (Result 1) and so on are
included in step 101.
The AN-AAA judges whether the terminal is roaming according to the
NAI. The AN-AAA judges whether the terminal belongs to the network
according to the second half of the NAI. If so, further judgment is made to
determine whether the terminal is a local one according to the first half of
the NAI in step 102.
If the terminal is roaming, the AN-AAA transmits its authentication
information to its home location in step 103.
If the terminal is a local one, the AN-AAA judges the type of the
terminal according to the IMSI in the NAI value in step 104.
If the terminal is in single-mode, the AN-AAA calculates the
authentication parameter 2 (Result 2) with the MD5 algorithm in step 105.
If the terminal is in dual-mode, the AN-AAA calculates the Result 2
with the CAVE algorithm. Here, the SSD_A is obtained with the previously
described approaches by the AN-AAA, and 32 bits extracted out of the
random number included in the Radius Access Request message serve as
the random number for the CAVE algorithm in step 106.
The Result 1 is compared with the Result 2 in step 107.
If they are equal to, the authentication passes, and the AN-AAA sends a


Radius Access Request Accept message to the HRPD AN in step 108.
If they are different, the authentication fails, and the AN-AAA sends a
Radius Access Request Reject message to the HRPD AN. Till now, the
authentication flow completes, in step 101.
While the present invention has been shown and described with
reference to certain embodiments thereof, it should be understood by those
skilled in the art that various changes in form and details may be made
therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as
defined by the appended claims.


WE CLAIM:
1. A method for Access Authentication in a wireless mobile communication system, the
method comprising:
receiving, by an Access Network Authentication, Authorization and Accounting server
(AN-AAA) of a High Rate Packet Data (HRPD) network, a message for access
authentication from a terminal;
selecting one of a Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) algorithm and a
Message-Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm according to one or more parameters included in the
message;
calculating a first Authentication Parameter using the selected algorithm;
comparing the first Authentication Parameter with a second Authentication Parameter
received from the terminal; and
determining whether or not the terminal is authentic according to the compared result.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the calculating comprises calculating the
first Authentication Parameter with the CAVE algorithm if the terminal is in a dual-mode in
which the terminal can access both of a Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000)
network and the HRPD network.


3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the calculating comprises calculating the
first Authentication Parameter with the MD5 algorithm if the terminal is in a single mode in
which the terminal can access only the HRPD network.
4. The method as claimed in to claim 1, comprising:
determining, by the AN-AAA, whether the terminal is roaming according to a Network
Access ID (NAI) in the message.
5. The method as claimed in claim 1, comprising:
determining, by the AN-AAA, a mode of the terminal according to an IMSI number
segment included in the message, wherein different International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI) number segments are allocated to single-mode terminals and dual-mode
terminals respectively by an operator.
6. The method as claimed in claim 1, comprising:
determining, by the AN-AAA, a mode of the terminal by retrieving special flag bits
stored in the AN-AAA according to an IMSI included in the message.
7. The method as claimed in claim 1, comprising:
obtaining from a CDMA2000 network, part A of Shared Secret Data (SSD_A) which is
necessary for the CAVE algorithm in the AN-AAA if there is no available SSD_A.


8. The method as claimed in claim 1, comprising:
interworking, by the AN-AAA, with a Home Location Register (HLR)/Authenticator
Center (AuC) in a CDMA2000 network for authenticating the terminal when using the
CAVE algorithm.
9. The method as claimed in claim 8, comprising:
exchanging, by the AN-AAA, messages with the HLR/AuC supports messages and
procedures, required to perform mobile station authentication as defined in an interface D
of Mobile Application Protocol (MAP-D), wherein the AN-AAA operates as a Visitor Location
Register (VLR).
10. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the message comprises an NAI, a
Random text and a Result, and for a dual-mode terminal, and the second Authentication
Parameter calculated by a Removable User Identification Module (R-UIM) of the terminal
through the CAVE algorithm is included in the Result.
11. The method as claimed in claim 10, wherein the NAI comprises an IMSI and
a domain name.


12. The method as claimed in to claim 1, wherein the AN-AAA performs the
CAVE algorithm by using a random number (RAND), which is a 32-bit number extracted
from a Random text included in the message.
13. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the message is received to the
AN-AAA through an Access Network (AN) of the HRPD network.
14. A method for Access Authentication in a wireless mobile communication
system, the method comprising steps of:
receiving, by an Access Network Authentication, Authorization and Accounting server
(AN-AAA) of a High Rate Packet Data (HRPD) network, a message comprising a first
authentication parameter for access authentication from a terminal, wherein the terminal
can access both of a Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000) network and the
HRPD network, and has a Removable User Identification Module (R-UIM) supporting a
Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption (CAVE) algorithm;
calculating a second authentication parameter using the CAVE algorithm;
comparing the first authentication parameter with the second authentication
parameter calculated by the AN-AAA; and
determining whether or not the terminal is authentic according to the compared result.
15. The method as claimed in claim 14, comprising:
sending an Accept message to the terminal when the access authentication is
approved.


16. The method as claimed in claim 14, comprising:
sending a Reject message when the access authentication is not approved.
17. The method as claimed in claim 14, comprising:
interworking with a Home Location Register (HLR)/Authenticator Center (AuC) of the
CDMA2000 network for authenticating the terminal when using the CAVE algorithm.
18. The method as claimed in claim 14, wherein the message is received to the
AN-AAA through an Access Network (AN) of the HRPD network.
19. An apparatus for Access Authentication in a wireless mobile communication
system comprising:
a terminal which can access both of a Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000)
network and a High Rate Packet Data (HRPD) network, for having a Removable User
Identification Module (R-UIM) supporting a Cellular Authentication and Voice Encryption
(CAVE) algorithm
an Access Network Authentication, Authorization and Accounting server (AN-AAA) of
the HRPD network, for receiving a message for access authentication and comprising a
first authentication parameter from the terminal, calculating an second authentication
parameter using the CAVE algorithm comparing the first authentication parameter with the
second authentication parameter calculated by the AN-AAA, and determining whether or
not the terminal is authentic according the compared result.

20. The apparatus as claimed in claim 19, wherein the AN-AAA interworks with a
Home Location Register (HLR)/Authenticator Center (AuC) of the CDMA2000 network for
authenticating the terminal when using the CAVE algorithm.
21. The apparatus as claimed in claim 19, wherein the message is received to
the AN-AAA through an Access Network (AN) of the HRPD network.


The invention relates to a method for Access Authentication in the High Rate Packet Data
Network is proposed in the present invention comprising steps of the AN-AAA receiving
the Radius Access Request message sent from the HRPD AN; the AN-AAA judging whether
a terminal is a roaming one according to the Network Access ID and transmits the
roaming terminal's authentication information to the terminal's home network. If said
terminal is a local one, the AN-AAA judges the type of the terminal according to the NAI
value. If said terminal is a single-mode one, the AN-AAA works out the Result2 with the
MD5 algorithm, if said terminal is in dual-mode, the AN-AAA calculates the Result2 with
the CAVE algorithm to compare the Result1 with the Result2.

Documents:


Patent Number 255870
Indian Patent Application Number 2202/KOLNP/2006
PG Journal Number 13/2013
Publication Date 29-Mar-2013
Grant Date 26-Mar-2013
Date of Filing 04-Aug-2006
Name of Patentee BEIJING SAMSUNG TELECOM R&D CENTER
Applicant Address 4F SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TOWER, NO.11 ZHONGGUANCUN NAN LU, HAIDIAN DISTRICT, BEIJING 100081
Inventors:
# Inventor's Name Inventor's Address
1 WEIMIN LIU 4F SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TOWER NO.11 ZHONGGUANCUN NAN LU, HAIDIAN DISTRICT, 100081 BEIJING, CHINA
2 GUANG YANG 4F SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TOWER NO.11 ZHONGGUANCUN NAN LU, HAIDIAN DISTRICT, 100081 BEIJING, CHINA
3 HUAJUN CAO 4F SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TOWER NO.11 ZHONGGUANCUN NAN LU, HAIDIAN DISTRICT, 100081 BEIJING, CHINA
PCT International Classification Number A61K 38/18
PCT International Application Number PCT/KR2005/000555
PCT International Filing date 2005-02-28
PCT Conventions:
# PCT Application Number Date of Convention Priority Country
1 200410007550.2 2004-02-27 China